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When the Going Gets Tough, the Tough Get Going 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A bank’s lending decision is affected by the amount of information it can access and by its capability to manage this 
information. The latter aspect implies that the bank has to decide whether borrowers should be managed in a local 
branch of the bank or in its headquarters. By looking at a sample of Finnish banks, the present research investigates a 
bank’s capability to extract profitability from both locally and centrally managed firms. We find that banks are able to 
properly discriminate between firms: those which should be managed by loan managers with expert knowledge in the 
bank’s headquarters due to their complexity, and those firms which should be managed in the bank’s local branch 
because they are simpler and need standard products and services. As a result, banks are able to extract risk-adjusted 
profitability (RAP) from both centrally and locally managed customers. Our findings clearly support the argument that 
the decision to centralise or decentralise the lending decision process is not an either/or decision: banks should 
implement both approaches and apply according to the type of firm they serve.  
 
Keywords:  Small Firms, Local Banks, Transaction Lending, Relationship Lending Risk- Adjusted Profitability  
JEL Codes: G21, G24 
 
I. Introduction 
When Florentine bankers decided to increase the loans provided to England in the 1330s, 
the English crown’s finances were already in dire straits because of the adverse outcomes of the 
wars in France. Retrospectively, it is therefore not a surprise that the default of the English crown 
in 1340 helped drive the Peruzzi out of business in 1343 and the Compagnia de’ Bardi in 1346. 
Had they been able to access more information and to analyse this information properly, it is very 
likely that they would have behaved differently (Cipolla 1994, 2002). This is one of many examples 
in the history of finance that illustrates the importance of accessing and analysing information in 
order to evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrower correctly. 
Today, banks are aware of the key role played by information and of the risk they incur 
when they evaluate the borrowers’ creditworthiness naively. This is particularly true in the case of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are characterised by a high level of opaqueness 
due to the limited information available about them (Berger and Frame 2007; Berger et al. 2001; 
Mason and Stark 2004). In order to reduce information asymmetries between a bank and a SME, 
loan managers aim to collect additional information that helps them to assess the SME’s 
creditworthiness. Previous research suggests that a loan manager’s ability to do so depends on 
various factors, which can be grouped into two major categories: (i) the characteristics of the 
market, the bank or the SME, and (ii) the characteristics of the relationship between the SME and 
the bank. With regard to the first category, scholars stress the role of the concentration of the 
financial system (Neuberger et al. 2008), since a more concentrated financial system makes it easier 
for the bank to access detailed information about the customer. Furthermore, the geographic 
distance between the bank and the borrower plays an important role in accessing information, as 
banks find it harder to collect information from distant customers (Alessandrini et al. 2009; 
DeYoung et al. 2008; Petersen and Rajan 2002). Moreover, earlier research finds that the age of 
the firm is a relevant factor. Younger firms are more affected by information asymmetry, as they 
do not have an established track record in terms of performance that can be used to evaluate the 
management capabilities required to be successful in the future (Angelini et al. 1998; Petersen and 
Rajan 1994). As far as the second category, i.e. the relationship between the SME and the bank, is 
concerned, research highlights the roles of the length and the breadth of the relationship (Berger 
and Udell 1995; Elsas 2005; Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995). Stronger relationships make it more 
difficult for the customer to hide information and easier for the bank to access additional 
information about the customer’s performance (Howorth et al. 2003). However, strong 
relationships may lead to hold-up costs for firms (Farinha and Santos 2002; Greenbaum et al. 1989; 
Rajan 1992; Sharpe 1990), as banks may accumulate private information to gain monopolistic 
power to deter their competitors (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan 1994). This private 
information leads to reduced information asymmetry between firms and banks, thus enabling banks 
to set competitive pricing strategies (Bharath et al. 2007, 2011; Cerqueiro et al. 2011). Uchida et 
al. (2012) suggest that loan managers play a key role in collecting private information because of 
their repeated interactions with the same firm over time.  
A bank’s lending decision is the result of a sequential information production process. 
Banks have to structure this process in order to respond to the challenges posed by processing the 
collected information. Danos et al. (1989) divide the bank’s lending decision process into three 
phases: (i) the examination of publicly available data about a firm, (ii) the personal examination of 
the firm’s operations, and (iii) the analysis of likelihood for the loan to be repaid. The findings of 
Stein (2002) suggest that the organisational form determines the preferential use of hard or soft 
information and that the use of hard or soft information, in turn, affects lending opportunities. In 
order to benefit from lending opportunities, banks have to differentiate between the duties of 
decentralised and centralised loan managers. Lending decisions that are primarily based on soft 
information should be taken locally, whereas lending decision that are primarily based on hard 
information should be taken centrally. The work by Liberti and Mian (2009) supports this 
argument. The authors show that subjective information, for example un-quantified soft 
information, is difficult to use across organisational layers due to problems in transferring that 
information. Due to these problems in communicating across hierarchies, the delegating of a firm 
to a local or central loan manager should depend on the nature of available information.  
All in all, previous research suggests the way in which banks decide to treat a loan 
application is an endogenous decision: banks first categorise their borrowers according to the 
nature of the available information and then select a subset of loan applications for more rigorous 
analysis if additional information about a firm is required. Banks employ this procedure because 
the additional analysis is not free of charge, as the time and effort needed in order to take the final 
lending decision generates additional costs for the bank. Thus, the additional information can have 
an effect on both the lending and the pricing decision, which is reflected in the profits a bank can 
derive from a specific customer (Liberti and Mian 2009; Uchida et al. 2012). This implies that 
banks should manage loan applications centrally if the benefits gained due to a better creditor 
evaluation and better pricing exceed the incremental costs linked to information processing because 
of the involvement of highly skilled loan managers, who spend a lot of time on their analysis. 
Interestingly, current research has not investigated such cost–benefit implications of the lending 
process.  
 
II. Hypotheses 
Building on Stein's (2002) notion of hierarchical and local information processing, we argue 
that loan managers who operate centrally are able to analyse firms in more detail than local 
managers and are thus able to generate additional value for the bank. This is due to the following 
reasons. First, loan managers who operate centrally provide support to multiple local branches and 
may therefore have a better overall picture of lending contracts and the level of competition in the 
market. This additional information allows them to make better-informed lending decisions as well 
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as decisions on the price of the loans. Second, the risk management of complex funding transactions 
needs to be handled by loan managers with expert knowledge. Loan managers who operate locally 
tend to deal with a plethora of different customers, e.g. firms operating in different industries, who 
have various needs – loans being just one of those needs. In order to be able to respond to these 
needs, they need to have broad banking and finance knowledge. However, due to this broad 
knowledge local loan managers may lack the expert knowledge required for more complex funding 
transactions. Third, loan managers who operate centrally are typically more experienced in coping 
with information asymmetries, since they are more likely to have hard information available about 
the borrower (Stein 2002).  Nevertheless, particularly in banks with flat hierarchical structures soft 
information – that is hardened by quantifying it to a measurable form (Petersen 2004) – can also 
be transferred from local loan managers to loan managers who operate centrally. In addition, loan 
manager who operate centrally might be able to access additional soft information about customers, 
for example, by looking at the interaction between the respective customer and its business partners 
who also happen to be customers of the bank. We therefore expect that limited access to soft 
information can be overcome due to the additional skills of centrally operating loan managers.  
If the process is effective, the thorough examination of a customer should allow the bank 
to select the right “problematic” customer, i.e. the customer who might be complex to evaluate, but 
who is creditworthy, and also price the loan correctly. We also argue, in line with Garicano (2000), 
that the loan managers’ expert knowledge increases the further up the hierarchical ladder they are 
found. This expert knowledge may not only enable centrally operating loan managers to assess 
borrower risk more accurately than loan managers who operate locally, but also to generate 
incremental risk-adjusted profitability (RAP) for the bank, with RAP being defined as the margin 
generated by the customer, taking into account the level of risk incurred by the bank in dealing 
with the customer. Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge are able to generate RAP 
for their bank. 
 
If hypothesis 1 is supported, it provides evidence that banks are able to extract RAP from 
centrally managed customers, but does not tell us anything about the reasons why. We argue that 
banks should not treat all customers centrally, but only the more problematic ones. Thus, banks 
should not only allocate customers to central or local loan managers according to the information 
available about them, but also according to their risk profile. As a consequence, centrally operating 
loan managers with expert knowledge should employ their expertise to evaluate the more complex 
and opaque and therefore riskier customers. In contrast, locally operating loan managers with broad 
knowledge should capitalise the soft information gathered through their personal relationships with 
the customer in order to provide not only loans, but also other financial products. Thus, we 
hypothesise that:  
 
H2: Centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge manage only “high risk” 
customers in order to extract RAP from them. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
A. Data 
This research is based on a sample of privately owned SMEs domiciled in Finland. The 
loan database incorporates 2,522 SME-year observations from the financial period of December 
2001 to December 2005. The data were provided by 21 small local cooperative banks. All the banks 
in the sample have a few branches and short lines of command. They tend to rely on deposits (since 
they are small, they are not able to approach regulated markets) and have very similar asset-liability 
mixes (they all tend to finance local households and small local firms). Moreover, the banks in the 
sample operate in a context characterised by limited competition. All in all, our sample is made up 
of banks that are similar, not only in terms of their cost structure, deposit and credit strategy, and 
asset-liability mix, but also in terms of their management objectives and style, operating efficiency, 
market served, etc. In line with prior literature, the sample includes only non-financial SMEs. 
------------ 
TABLE 1 HERE 
------------ 
The dataset includes firm-specific information, such as financial figures, and information 
about bank-firm relationships, such as data about loans, their characteristics and the services 
provided to firms. Both the firms’ financial figures and the bank–firm relationship data are captured 
at the end of December in each year considered. In addition, banks evaluate and assign internal 
credit ratings to firms. The internal ratings summarise information about firm quality and credit 
risk in broad terms, and they are determined on the basis of firm-specific information. Internal 
ratings are assigned as a part of complying with the Basel II capital adequacy rules by using the F-
IRB (foundation internal-rating-based approach) to estimate a firm’s probability of default1. All 
banks considered in our sample rely on the same internal rating system that exploits the same set 
of variables, giving them the same weight. This implies that the credit evaluation does not depend 
on the respective bank and that the firms considered in our sample, which migrate from one bank 
to another, will be rated in the same way. This aspect is not trivial since differences in the way in 
which banks evaluate and rate a firm could have adversely affected the consistency of our results. 
The internal rating system used looks at a firm’s performance and mainly relies on the information 
that the bank can access from the firm’s financial report and from the bank’s system archives. The 
loan managers who deal with the customer are in charge of feeding the system with data and 
revising the internal rating, typically on a yearly basis, although riskier customers may be re-
evaluated more frequently. The loan managers use the internal rating system in order to make 
lending decisions. Loan managers are allowed some room for manoeuvre. However, when the 
banks deal with more complex customers. i.e. customers who ask for greater loans and who are 
considered riskier or who need finance for a complex project, the lending decision is taken by their 
headquarters, where expert loan managers scrutinise the credit request and the firm performance, 
instead of the locally operating loan manager. This happened in 195 cases in our dataset and is the 
focus of our research.  
                                                 
 
 
1 Banks can use this approach only subject to approval from the Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA). 
In the F-IRB approach, banks are allowed to use their own empirical model to estimate the probabilities of default for 
individual firms.  
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The ratings are based on a scale ranging from 3 (highest quality) to 11 (lowest quality). The 
absence of firms with ratings of 1 or 2 is due to the fact that none of the sample firms are publicly 
listed, thus none can ever receive one of the top two internal ratings. The rating of each firm is 
included in the dataset. 
All banks in the sample are small local cooperative banks with strong links to the 
communities they serve. Table 2 presents data about them. 
------------ 
TABLE 2 HERE 
------------ 
The banks show differences in terms of both assets and equity: in the case of assets, the 
largest bank is almost 2.5 times the size of the smallest; regarding equity, the most capitalised bank 
is five times the size of the least capitalised one. However, by relating these numbers to the overall 
banking market in Finland, in which the total assets of all banks at the end of the sample period 
amount to 294 billion €, it is apparent that these differences are marginal. The level of non-
performing assets compared to total assets is extremely low and very similar for all the banks in 
the sample, reflecting the similar levels of risk incurred by them.  
 
B. Methodology 
In order to examine the impact of credit evaluations run centrally by loan managers with 
expert knowledge, we differentiate between firms whose credit applications were evaluated 
centrally (n=195) and firms whose credit applications were evaluated locally (n=2,327). The 
analysis is carried out using STATA version 14. In order to test H1, we regress the dummy variable 
SPEC, which indicates whether the credit application was evaluated centrally, and a set of control 
variables on the banks’ RAP using OLS. Then, we re-test H1 by using panel regression (random 
effects). 
To test H2, we first investigate the selection process pursued by the bank and then whether 
the loan managers contribute to the bank’s RAP. If loan managers with expert knowledge add to 
the bank’s RAP because they deal with high-risk borrowers, we should find that banks assign loan 
managers who have expert knowledge to highly opaque firms – and that these loan managers have 
a positive impact on RAP when we look at the selected firms. 
To account for the contextual factors that impact on our dependent variable but are not an 
integral part of the phenomenon, we also include control variables in the model. As discussed above 
opaqueness is a key contextual factor in lending decisions and impacts on the RAP of customers. 
As there is no direct measure for opaqueness, we draw on a set of indirect measures that reflect 
opaqueness. The proxies used are length of a relationship and the number of different banks with 
which a firm has business relationships. Longer relationships with a smaller number of banks 
reflect lower opaqueness for bank managers in loan decisions.   
Due to the possibility that our results suffer from endogeneity linked to reverse causality, 
we also implement a robustness check. Even if we find support for H1 (i.e. centrally managed 
customers generate RAP for the bank) and H2 (i.e. centrally managed customers are high risk 
customers and generate RAP for the bank), we cannot rule out completely that a bank’s decision 
to handle a customer centrally instead of locally is linked to the customer’s profitability. Banks 
may decide to centrally manage those customers whom they consider more worthwhile, so as to 
support them in more complex projects and keep them satisfied. In order to control for reverse 
causality, we re-estimate the regressions using lagged observations. If there is reverse causality, 
the regression with the lagged observations should produce coefficients that are reversed.  
 
IV. Variables Description 
A. Dependent Variable 
One of the distinctive features of this work is the dependent variable. In order to test the 
hypotheses, we develop a measure for the RAP of banks. This measure is based on two different 
components, namely the margin generated from a specific customer with respect to the products 
and services sold by the bank (loans and other financial products or services) and the risk the bank 
incurs by serving this customer. 
The participating banks use activity-based costing to monitor the margin generated from 
each customer. They calculate the margin as the difference between (1) the income generated from 
the customer in terms of interest payments on short- and long-term loans as well as fees paid to the 
bank, (2) the interest that the bank has to pay to the providers of funds (be they savers, bondholders, 
etc.) plus the fees that the bank has to pay when it outsources or buys external financial services, 
and (3) the cost of the time the bank’s personnel allocates to specific customers. The internal rating 
used by the bank captures information about a customer’s financial position and is determined by 
firm-specific information. Lower credit quality, as reflected in these ratings, is likely to be 
associated with less credit being granted, a higher loan price or more collateral being required. The 
measure of a bank’s RAP from a given customer is the ratio of the margin generated from the 
customer, in euros, to the internal rating of that customer: 
 
𝐑𝐀𝐏 =
∑  [𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄
𝐒𝐓𝐃 (𝐒𝐓𝐃) + 𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄
𝐋𝐓𝐃(𝐋𝐓𝐃) − 𝒊𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊(𝐒𝐓𝐃 + 𝐋𝐓𝐃)] + ∑[(𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐒𝐌𝐄 − 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊] − 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐬
𝐑𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐍𝐆
 
 
where RAP is the risk-adjusted profitability, 𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄
𝐒𝐓𝐃  is the specific interest rate charged to the 
customer by the bank for short-term loans, 𝐒𝐓𝐃 is the amount of the short-term loan, 𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄
𝐋𝐓𝐃  is the 
specific interest rate charged to the customer by the bank for long-term loans, 𝐋𝐓𝐃  is the amount 
of the long-term loan, 𝒊𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 is the average cost of funding for the bank, 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐒𝐌𝐄 and 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 are 
respectively the fee received from the customer and the cost of services provided to that customer 
that are outsourced or bought from other financial institutions, and Pers is the cost of the personnel 
involved in assisting the customer. Typically, centrally managed customers involve a higher 
proportion of personnel costs in their RAP. One reason for that is the transaction costs resulting 
from information travelling up and down more levels of hierarchy. With regard to centrally handled 
customers, loan managers need more time to become familiar with the specifics of the loan 
application because they cannot draw on their experience and knowledge gained from direct 
interaction with the customers.    
 
B. Independent and Control Variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use a dummy variable that records whether a loan 
manager makes a lending decision with expert knowledge in the headquarters of the bank (SPEC). 
The dummy has a value of 1 when the lending decision is taken in the headquarters of the bank and 
0 when it is taken in the local branch of the bank. A centrally pursued evaluation of a firm implies 
that loan managers with expert knowledge, who are able to allocate more time and effort in 
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assessing the firm’s creditworthiness and the request for funds, are involved. As a consequence, 
the costs of the bank increase. However, a more thorough evaluation of the firm might also allow 
for the development of relational capital that increases the bank’s access to private information and 
may therefore enhance cross-selling possibilities. This implies that there is no upfront certainty 
about the relationship between SPEC and RAP. If the benefits gained from the additional 
information gathered exceed the additional personnel costs, the relationship will be positive and 
significant. If, however, the additional personnel costs out-weigh the benefits gained from the 
incremental information, the relationship will be negative and significant. A non-significant 
relationship implies that the impact of the centralisation of the lending decision on RAP is not clear. 
We also add a set of controls. First, we control for the length of the relationship between a 
firm and a bank, expressed in years (LENGTH). The length of the relationship is an indicator of 
relationship strength that is widely used in the prior literature (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen 
and Rajan 1994). Since the length of the relationship increases the amount of knowledge and 
reduces the incremental costs faced by the bank in evaluating the firm’s riskiness and its financial 
needs, we expect a positive relationship between LENGTH and the bank’s RAP. Second, we 
control for the number of relationships the SME has with other banks (RELATIONSHIPS). A 
firm’s diversification of its banking services across several sources is expected to be negatively 
associated with the bank’s RAP (Elsas 2005).  
Third, we control for the amount of loans using the total amount of loans the bank provides 
to the firm (TOTALLOANS), since the amount of loans can be an important factor in deciding to 
transfer the lending decision from the local loan manager to the headquarters. We expect the 
amount of loans to be positively associated with the bank’s RAP, since interest income increases 
the bank’s margin (as long as it does not increase borrower risk too much). Moreover, we control 
for the firm’s size, which is expressed by its assets (FIRM_ASSETS). Firms with larger assets need 
more funds to finance them and are thus expected to rely more on both long-term and short-term 
loans. At the same time, larger assets implicitly provide a greater capability for the bank to recover 
the loans if the firm defaults, thus reducing the bank’s risk. As a consequence, we expect a firm’s 
assets to be positively related to a bank’s RAP.  
Since the bargaining power of the customer is one of the core factors that affect a bank’s 
RAP, we control for the bargaining power of the customer, over and above its firm size. An SME’s 
non-size-related bargaining power is measured using its equity-to-debt ratio (EQUITY_RATIO). 
Firms with a high equity-to-debt ratio are considered financially sound and thus better able to deal 
with any difficulties. The intrinsic financial solidity of firms with high equity-to-debt ratios puts 
them in a better position to negotiate better loan terms (particularly regarding the interest rates 
charged) and lower fees for other banking services. 
A firm’s profitability is included by using its return on equity (ROE). The ROE shows the 
firm’s ability to generate profits to repay its loans. Additionally, according to pecking order theory, 
a high ROE increases the firm’s ability to use retained profit to finance its on-going operations and 
growth, thereby reducing its dependence on bank finance. The expectation is that a high ROE 
decreases the bank’s RAP. 
In order to control for overall market conditions, we include the change in gross domestic 
product (CH_GDP).  
Finally, we add a control for the bank’s size (BANK_ASSETS). RAP might be affected by 
a bank’s size as larger banks are able to offer more products and services and can therefore have 
more negotiating power and thus enjoy higher RAP. However, smaller banks might be more 
effective in selecting and keeping customers by relying on their relationship with a firm, and can 
thus face reduced risk that can be transformed into higher RAP. Since the direction of the effect is 
not clear, we do not have any expectations about whether this variable is positive or negative. 
 
V. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables considered. 
------------ 
TABLE 3 HERE 
------------ 
RAP has an average value of 798, but with values spread from -3 (the least profitable 
relationship from a bank’s point of view) to 9,003 (the most profitable relationship from a bank’s 
point of view). This means that banks are able to extract margins from on-going relationships, the 
losses being almost exclusively linked to the default of the customer and the consequent write-offs 
that banks have to record. The average RAP of the subgroup of centrally evaluated firms is 2,261, 
whereas the average RAP of the subgroup of locally evaluated firms is 675. The existence of 
multiple bank relationships per SME is 0.115 on average, with 0.354 in centrally evaluated firms 
and 0.095 in locally evaluated firms. The average length of the relationship in our sample is 
approximately 15 years, the longest relationship being 66 years, which suggests stable relationships 
between the SMEs and the banks. Our average relationship length is longer than the average length 
found in the seminal works by Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1995, 1994). 
However, it is in line with papers focusing on Europe (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Hernandez-
Canovas and Martınez-Solano 2010; Howorth and Moro 2012; Moro et al. 2012).  
On average, a firm’s total loans amount to 2.2 million Euros. However, centrally evaluated 
firms tend to have considerably higher total loans than locally evaluated firms. The average amount 
of a firm’s assets is 1.3 million Euros, and the average equity ratio is 26.2%, suggesting that the 
average firm is quite leveraged. A firm’s ROE amounts to an average of 37.5%. Interestingly, firms 
in the subgroup of locally evaluated firms are more profitable in terms of their ROE than firms in 
the subgroup of centrally evaluated firms.  
In terms of correlations, RAP is positively correlated to SPEC and TOTALLOANS. As 
expected, FIRM ASSETS is positively correlated to RAP. SPEC is correlated with FIRM ASSETS, 
suggesting that centrally evaluated firms are bigger in terms of their total assets.  
 
VI. Econometric Results 
A. Main Results 
In order to test the first hypothesis, we estimate two regressions (OLS and panel regression 
with random effects) that include a dummy as a core variable that reports who evaluated the 
customer, i.e. loan managers who operate in a bank’s local branch (0) or loan managers who operate 
at its headquarters (1). The regressions also include a set of controls like the relationship’s strength, 
borrower characteristics, overall market conditions (change in GDP), bank-specific differences 
(BANK_ASSETS) and year dummies. Table 4 reports the regression results. 
--------------- 
TABLE 4 HERE 
---------------- 
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The first regression (OLS) is significant (p < .000) and has an R2 of 0.487. The White test 
suggests some level of heteroscedasticity in the model. Thus, we use robust standard errors 
estimation. At the same time, the regression does not present collinearity problems2. The length of 
the relationship (LENGTH) is highly significant and positive. Looking at the interest-related 
products, TOTALLOANS is positive, as expected, and is highly significant. Thus, there is evidence 
that the strength of the relationships and the amount of short- and long-term loans provided to 
SMEs contribute to a bank’s RAP. As expected, a firm’s size (FIRM_ASSETS) impacts positively 
on a bank’s RAP, while a firm’s financial solidity (EQUITY_RATIO) and profitability (ROE) are 
not significant. Finally, market conditions (CH_GDP) are not significant, whereas the control for 
bank size (BANK_ASSETS) is weakly positive and significant.   
Our variable of interest (SPEC) is positive and significant, suggesting that centrally 
evaluated firms contribute positively to a bank’s RAP. This positive relationship suggests that the 
benefits linked to the activities pursued by centrally operating loan managers with expert 
knowledge for the respective customer prevail over the additional costs accrued because of the 
extra time and possibly higher personnel costs.  
The second regression presents the results estimated using a panel random effect regression. 
In this regression the firm-specific effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent 
variables. The regression is significant (p < .000)3. The relationship variables follow the same 
pattern as in the other specification: LENGTH and TOTALLOANS are positive and significant. 
Regarding firm variables, FIRM_ASSETS is highly significant and positive. In this specification, 
EQUITY_RATIO is highly significant and is negative as was expected. In line with the first 
regression CH_GDP and BANK_ASSETS are not significant. Further, SPEC is positive and 
significant, confirming the role centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge play in 
contributing to a bank’s profitability. 
However, this first level of analysis only tells us that centrally managed customers are able 
to contribute to the bank’s RAP, but does not tell us the reasons why. In order to investigate why 
customers are managed centrally (H2) we estimate an instrumental variable regression with an 
endogenous regressor. First, we separately estimate a probit regression for SPEC on a set of 
independent variables and year dummies4. We model the selection process according to a firm’s 
information asymmetry, the firm’s characteristics (risk of the firm) and its performance. As far as 
information asymmetry is concerned, we use a set of variables that measure whether a bank is 
adversely affected in accessing information. More specifically, we look at the firm’s number of 
relationships with other banks (RELATIONSHIPS) and its length of the relationship with the bank 
(LENGTH). In terms of risk we include the amount of the firm’s assets (FIRM_ASSETS), the 
amount of loans (TOTALLOANS), the return on equity (ROE) and the equity ratio 
(EQUITY_RATIO). The results are reported in table 5. 
------------- 
TABLE 5 HERE 
                                                 
 
 
2 All VIF-values are below 5, the mean VIF-value is 2.20. 
3 Within R
2 
of 0.049 and between R
2 
of 0.465. 
4 VIF values are below 5, the mean VIF value is 1.08. 
------------- 
We find that the relationship variables (RELATIONSHIPS, LENGTH, TOTALLOANS) 
as well as ASSETS and EQUITY_RATIO are significant. All of these variables are positive except 
for LENGTH. Our findings suggest that the probability of being evaluated by loan managers in the 
bank’s headquarters decreases with the length of the relationship and increases with the number of 
banks the firm borrows from. This implies that more opaque firms are more likely to be managed 
centrally. In addition, the probability of being evaluated by loan managers in the bank’s 
headquarters increases with the amount of loans provided to the borrower, possibly because higher 
lending volumes increase the potential loss at default and therefore the bank’s risk. Finally, the 
probability of being evaluated centrally increases with the firm’s assets, implying that centrally 
operating loan managers with expert knowledge are asked to deal with more complex projects that 
require a more thorough evaluation of the customer. All in all, the regression suggests that firms 
evaluated by centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge are more opaque and riskier, 
and invest more. As a consequence, they are also more complex to deal with. However, are firms 
that are more complex to deal with also the ones that generate higher RAP for the bank?  
To answer this question, we re-estimate our model by using instrumental variable 
regression (TREATREG). This allows us to examine whether centrally managed firms are also the 
ones that impact positively on RAP. The results are reported in table 6. 
------------- 
TABLE 6 HERE 
------------- 
We determine the strength of our instrument by calculating the F statistics. The F value is 
16.20 and not smaller than the critical value, which supports the view that our instrument is not 
weak. The model suggests that the coefficients of the selection of customer evaluation are 
qualitatively similar to those of the probit model. In addition, the results on RAP are close to the 
results of OLS regression on RAP. Finally, in the instrumental regression, SPEC is positive and 
significant, suggesting that firms which are evaluated by loan managers in a bank’s headquarters 
increase the bank’s RAP. Thus, we find support for the fact that banks select more opaque, riskier 
and more complex firms to be evaluated by centrally operating loan managers, who are, in turn, 
able to extract profitability from them.  
 
B. Robustness Checks 
As discussed in the hypotheses section, banks might decide to manage firms centrally 
because they consider them important due to the possibility to generate a high RAP. In this case, 
the bank would be aware of the additional value provided by these firms and therefore decide to 
deal with them centrally in order to grant them a high quality service and to consolidate their 
relationship with them. As a consequence, there would be reverse causality between RAP and being 
centrally managed. In order to investigate this possible issue, we re-estimate the regression using 
one-year lagged variables. If centrally managed firms are the ones that are considered more 
important for the bank because of the RAP they are generating, we should find a negative 
significant relationship between the variable of interest (SPEC) and RAP. The results are reported 
in table 7. 
------------- 
TABLE 7 HERE 
------------- 
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The regression is significant (p < .000). LENGTH and TOTALLOANS are positive and 
significant. As far as the variables of a firm are concerned, only FIRM_ASSETS is significant and 
has the expected result. In line with the first model, CH_GDP is not significant and 
BANK_ASSETS is positive, but not significant. Interestingly, SPEC is again positive and 
significant. This evidence rules out reverse causality. 
Finally, it might be argued that our analysis suffers from endogeneity, since the dependent 
variable is affected by the internal rating of a firm as well as the decision process, which is 
manifested in the independent variables. In order to rule out this issue, we retest our specifications 
using the absolute return of the customer as a dependent variable (detailed results not reported 
here). Interestingly, we obtain the same results as the ones presented in tables 4 to 7. More 
importantly, the variable SPEC is always positive and significant. In addition, its coefficients are 
not significantly different from those presented in tables 4 to 7. 
 
VII. Discussion 
Our analysis provides interesting results that are in line with the findings of Stein (2002) 
and Liberti and Mian (2009). Lending approaches change according to the type of customer and 
the information banks can access. Customers whose creditworthiness is easy to evaluate, because 
the information about them is mainly soft and accessible for local loan managers as well as those 
who need plain vanilla loans, are managed by loan managers in local branches of the bank. In 
contrast, customers who are characterised by a high level of information asymmetry, who pursue 
highly complex projects or who increase the exposure of the bank regarding the amount of the loan, 
are managed by loan managers in the bank’s headquarters. In the latter case, banks can be adversely 
affected by the loss of soft information, but at the same time benefit from the expert knowledge of 
the loan managers involved in evaluating the creditworthiness of the customers.  
Our results suggest that this strategy pays. By evaluating “simple” customers locally, banks 
can benefit from reduced costs in managing them and local loan managers can exploit their personal 
knowledge of them. Regarding “complex” customers, a bank’s centrally operating loan managers 
with expert knowledge are able to turn high risk and potentially low return customers into highly 
rewarding ones by increasing the bank’s RAP. This happens for various reasons. First, loan 
managers who operate centrally are able to employ their expertise to make an informed decision 
about whether to lend to a customer or not. In addition, not only are they able to price a loan 
according to the riskiness of the customer, they can also propose and sell financial products (e.g. 
loans) that better fit the customer’s needs, implicitly reducing the risk the bank can incur when the 
borrower is asked to deal with a loan that does not match its cash flows. 
 Since centrally operating loan managers increase the RAP realized from the 
respective customer, banks could be tempted to move lending decisions entirely to their 
headquarters. However, our analysis suggests that this would be the wrong way to operate since 
loan managers who operate locally are able to generate RAP. The complete centralisation of the 
lending decision process would lead to an ineffective and inefficient use of resources. This point is 
strongly supported by the key role played by local loan managers in our sample: the largest majority 
of the loans (more than 92%) are managed by loan managers in local branches and contribute to 
the profitability of the bank. This implies that local loan managers are able to contribute 
dramatically to a bank’s profitability. At the same time, the limited number of loans that are 
managed by loan managers in a bank’s headquarters suggests that banks are very selective about 
allocating firms to centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge. Possibly, they are 
aware of the additional costs incurred by involving expert staff and thus try to keep their use of 
them to a minimum. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
For many years, research on bank lending has investigated how both soft and hard factors 
affect lending relationships. Firm characteristics, such as the age of a firm, the length of a lending 
relationship and the concentration of the bank system are just some of the aspects that have been 
examined and their impact on both banks (in terms of reduction of the risk incurred) and firms (in 
terms of access to credit) have been discussed. In particular, Stein (2002) and Liberti and Mian 
(2009) proposed that banks should employ different lending approaches according to the customers 
they have and the information they are able to exploit. Whereas complex customers who can mainly 
provide hard, factual data should be analysed centrally, less complex but very opaque customers 
should be examined locally by using soft information. 
 Our findings provide support for Stein's (2002) arguments. We find that banks are 
able to extract profitability from their lending relationships both when they manage their borrowers 
in the bank’s headquarters and in its local branches. Nevertheless, borrowers who are evaluated 
centrally are those who bear greater risk, since they are more complex and characterised by a higher 
degree of opaqueness that can only partially be addressed by centrally operating loan managers. 
By managing high-risk customers in a bank’s headquarters, banks are able to reduce the risk and 
to extract RAP from them as well. In particular, we contribute to Stein (2002) and Liberti and Mian 
(2009) by showing that communication in hierarchies allows for specialised knowledge 
accumulation. Our findings also contribute to Garicano's (2000) notions of the specialisation of 
knowledge in hierarchies, not just the transmission of information.  
However, our research has several limitations: first, it relies on a dataset that considers only 
observations from Finland. Prospective research should try to investigate whether our findings hold 
true in other bank contexts. Second, it uses data from before 2008. We cannot rule out that the 
financial crisis and the changes in the banking regulation impacted on the way banks decide how 
to treat borrowers. In particular, it would not be very surprising to discover that banks now manage 
a larger percentage of borrowers centrally.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study indicates that banks are able to properly select 
and manage their borrowers: they can extract RAP from both easy-to-treat borrowers, who are 
managed locally, and more complex borrowers, who are managed centrally by loan managers with 
expert knowledge.  
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Table 1. Market Characteristics 
 
This table presents the Finnish credit market for lending and guarantees (in million euros) by sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Bank Statistics 
 
Capital adequacy ratio (in %) is the ratio of own funds to the total amount of risk-weighted items. 
Non-performing assets (in %) is the ratio of non-performing assets including zero-interest and guaranteed 
claims to claims on the public and off-balance sheet items. 
 
 
 
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
Non-financial corporations 39,507 30,126 27,994 27,981 27,042
Financial and insurance institutions 992 767 790 586 1,269
Public sector entities and nonprofit institutions 3,669 2,092 2,555 1,619 1,508
Households 63,592 55,509 49,188 43,452 39,832
Foreign markets 12,802 7,587 5,950 6,911 9,473
Total 120,562 96,081 86,477 80,549 79,124
Non-performing assets 331 359 417 516 582
Non-performing assets to total 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7%
Capital adequacy Non-performing 
Bank Net profit Assets Equity ratio % assets %
1 7,612.50 441,023.75 49,213.25 22.6 0.7
2 4,673.00 416,692.50 23,777.75 20.9 0.5
3 7,776.75 502,571.00 48,543.50 21.4 0.5
4 9,490.25 679,642.75 100,524.75 27.1 0.8
5 5,572.25 513,603.25 36,934.25 14.8 0.5
6 5,835.25 421,904.75 36,063.50 15.8 0.9
7 4,841.50 405,811.50 33,926.50 18.3 0.4
8 14,931.75 1,202,881.50 73,311.25 11.4 0.5
9 12,050.50 752,773.50 68,418.25 19.3 0.3
10 3,251.00 367,396.00 23,635.25 14.0 0.7
11 4,822.50 505,568.50 41,485.50 17.0 0.3
12 4,677.50 510,144.00 29,443.00 11.9 0.7
13 10,664.50 1,076,093.00 61,651.50 12.1 0.5
14 5,531.25 431,610.00 33,154.50 12.7 0.9
15 9,546.25 627,188.75 55,312.00 18.1 0.2
16 2,201.25 574,952.00 19,971.75 9.7 0.9
17 7,388.00 341,966.25 60,788.50 32.7 0.3
18 10,151.75 1,290,003.25 57,681.50 10.9 0.5
19 8,610.50 1,411,773.00 53,761.25 12.3 1.0
20 5,723.10 594,952.60 36,664.45 15.2 0.8
21 4,556.75 457,302.50 33,083.00 15.8 0.9
 Table 3. Summary Statistics 
The data are bank–firm relationships of small and medium-sized firms located in Finland from year 2001 to 2005. 
All data are expressed in quantities, as percentages or in euros. The bank–firm relationship is classified as centrally 
managed if a loan manager in the bank’s headquarters manages the loan. The bank–firm relationship is classified as 
locally managed if a loan manager in a local branch of the bank manages the loan. 
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Table 4. Regression of the Role of the Bank Specialist on RAP 
 
The dependent variable is a bank’s RAP, measured at the financial year-end. 
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
SPEC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
 
 
 
 
Number of obs. 2522 Number of obs. 2522
F(12, 2509) 35.35 Wald chi2(12) 161.84
Prob > F 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000
R-squared 0.487 R-squared (within) 0.049
Root MSE 0.718 R-squared (between) 0.465
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
SPEC Centrally (1) vs locally (0) managed customers 0.473 0.131 *** 0.552 0.223 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation 0.066 0.015 *** 0.066 0.027 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.432 0.043 *** 0.133 0.048 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.354 0.056 *** 0.436 0.093 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio -0.008 0.015 -0.065 0.021 ***
ROE Firm's return on equity 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.012
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.001 0.014 -0.014 0.009
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets 0.034 0.019 * 0.026 0.029
Year 
2002 -0.034 0.051 -0.016 0.038
2003 -0.057 0.047 -0.020 0.038
2004 0.290 0.054 *** 0.107 0.044 ***
2005 0.212 0.053 *** 0.025 0.043
CONSTANT -0.130 0.045 *** -0.078 0.042
rho
sigma_u
sigma_e
RANDOM EFFECTS
0.596
0.503
0.414
OLS
author & author  When the going gets tough, the tough get going 1
8 
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Table 5. Probability of a Firm to be Managed Centrally or Locally 
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
RELATIONS is the number of bank relationships that a firm has.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2522
209.90
0.000
0.295
-484.200
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>t
RELATIONS Number of bank relations 0.179 0.034 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation -0.231 0.051 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.224 0.048 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.405 0.060 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio 0.157 0.040 ***
ROE Firm's return on equity -0.030 0.049
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.055 0.045
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets -0.007 0.052
Year 
2002 0.447 0.282
2003 0.368 0.284
2004 0.705 0.280 **
2005 0.648 0.281 **
CONSTANT -2.213 0.269 ***
Selection of lending evaluation
PROBIT SPEC
Number of obs.
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikehood
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Table 6. Instrumental Variable Regression of the Role of Bank Specialists on RAP 
 
The dependent variable in the first-stage is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is centrally managed 
and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the second-stage is the bank’s RAP, measured at the financial year-end. 
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
RELATIONS is the number of bank relationships that a firm has.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
 
2522
419.87
0.000
16.195
0.000
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
RELATIONS Number of bank relations 0.176 0.035 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation -0.221 0.051 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.179 0.037 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.423 0.062 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio 0.160 0.040 ***
ROE Firm's return on equity -0.041 0.049
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.055 0.045
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets -0.010 0.052
SPEC Lending technology 0.407 0.148 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation 0.064 0.015 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.435 0.043 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.362 0.057 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio -0.001 0.015
ROE Firm's return on equity 0.007 0.011
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.001 0.013
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets 0.035 0.018 * 
Year 
2002 -0.034 0.051
2003 -0.057 0.047
2004 0.290 0.054 ***
2005 0.212 0.053 ***
CONSTANT -0.125 0.045 ***
rho
sigma
lambda
F(1,2513)
Prob > F
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2
TREATREG
Number of obs.
0.034
Selection of lending evaluation
Regression on RAP
0.047
0.716
author & author  When the going gets tough, the tough get going 2
0 
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Table 7. Regression of the Role of Bank Specialists on Lagged RAP 
 
The dependent variable is the bank’s RAP lagged one year.  
 
 
* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.  
Variable Description:  
SPEC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise.  
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.  
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.  
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.  
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.  
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.  
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.  
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.  
Number of obs. 1729
F(12, 2509) 38.15
Prob > F 0.000
R-squared 0.583
Root MSE 0.638
Name Description Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|
SPEC Centrally (1) vs locally (0) managed customers 0.502 0.155 ***
LENGTH Length of the relation 0.063 0.018 ***
TOTALLOANS Total amount of loans 0.456 0.039 ***
FIRM_ASSETS Firm assets 0.343 0.076 ***
EQUITY_RATIO Firm's equity ratio 0.002 0.018
ROE Firm's return on equity -0.007 0.014
CH_GDP Change in GDP 0.022 0.016
BANK_ASSETS Bank assets 0.033 0.020
Year 
2003 -0.022 0.052
2004 -0.044 0.051
2005 0.226 0.055 ***
CONSTANT -0.119 0.051 **
OLS, lagged
